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Abstract 
Using linked employer-employee data for Britain we find job satisfaction and job anxiety are 
negatively correlated but higher wages are associated with higher job satisfaction and higher job 
anxiety.  However, we observe a positive association between higher wages and non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction, which disappears with the inclusion of our effort measures. Thus high effort levels 
provide high levels of non-pecuniary job satisfaction and higher wages, in contrast to what 
compensating wage differentials predicts. On the other hand, the positive association between wages 
and pay satisfaction and the positive association between wages and job anxiety are both robust to the 
inclusion of our effort measures and rich job controls. Mean wages of co-workers are positively 
associated with pay satisfaction but there is no significant association with non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction or job anxiety.  Thus there is a positive spill-over to workers from being in a high-wage 
workplace and there is no support for the proposition that within-workplace wage differentials are a 
source of job anxiety. 
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If people prefer leisure to work they will seek wages to compensate for the disutility of 
employment.  It seems natural to assume that the higher the compensation, the better the 
employee will feel when undertaking the work.  Higher wages may foster greater wellbeing 
in other ways too, for instance through spending power or social status.  However, there is an 
emerging literature questioning the link between income growth and happiness.  There are 
diminishing wellbeing returns to higher income and habituation effects mean positive income 
shocks tend to have temporary effects on wellbeing. We contribute to the literature using 
linked employer-employee data to establish the relationship between wages and three 
dimensions of employee wellbeing, namely pay satisfaction (PJS), non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction (NPJS) and job anxiety (JA) as captured by Warr’s contentment-anxiety scale 
(Warr, 2007).  This proves to be highly informative.  Although job satisfaction (JS) and job 
anxiety (JA) are negatively correlated, their unconditional and conditional relationships with 
wages are different from one another.   In keeping with the literature, wages and satisfaction 
are positively correlated.  However, higher wages are also associated with greater anxiety and 
stress.  The effect is robust to the inclusion of rich job controls (3-digit occupation, a job 
autonomy scale), effort measures and workplace fixed effects.  These results are hard to 
reconcile with a simple compensating wage differentials story.  Mean wages of co-workers 
are positively associated with pay satisfaction, as others have noted, but they are not 
significantly associated with non-pecuniary job satisfaction or job anxiety. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section Two reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literatures linking wages to employee JS and JA.  Section Three introduces our 
data.  Section Four outlines the empirical strategy.  Section Five reports our results and 
Section Six concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Literatures 
 
If higher pay comes as part of a wage-effort bargain the employee may be expected to take on 
more onerous responsibilities or exert greater effort in return for the higher wage. 
Alternatively, she may work in poorer working conditions, a point emphasised in the 
compensating wage differential literature (Rosen, 1986). Either way, the higher wage is paid 
in recognition of the disutility engendered by the work. For this reason, intrinsically 
satisfying jobs may attract lower wages than other, less intrinsically satisfying jobs.  If higher 
wages simply compensate for greater disutility from work and the analyst is able to account 
for all aspects of the job, one might imagine a relatively weak effect of wages on wellbeing.  
On the other hand, to the extent that it is not possible to control for all aspects of the job, a 
negative wage effect on wellbeing may be picking up that otherwise unobservable component 
of job quality or worker effort. 
 
There are indications of labour intensification in the post-War period which have arisen, in 
part, as a response to growing product market competition and technological advances which 
have reduced the costs of capital-intensive production processes and monitoring procedures 
geared to maximising the effort that employees can expend in pursuit of productivity gains.  
Survey research indicates substantial increases in reported stress and anxiety among British 
employees in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, after which time it appears to have 
stabilised at this relatively high level (Green, 2006, 2009).  This has been attributed to 
increases in work effort, at both the extensive and intensive margins, required by employers 2 
 
and by the sorts of jobs that have become more numerous in the economy (Green, 2009).  
This matters because anxiety and stress are sources of ill-health and disease (Gardner and 
Oswald, 2004) and individuals report lower levels of happiness when they exhibit stress and 
anxiety (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008).  Other things equal, one might expect employers 
to compensate employees for increasing stress and anxiety occasioned by employment.  This 
is precisely what survey research indicates since, over the decade to 2001, British employees 
experienced declining satisfaction with intrinsic aspects of their jobs – notably work effort 
and job autonomy – but rising satisfaction with extrinsic aspects of their jobs like pay (Green 
and Tsitsianis, 2004). 
 
Higher wages may foster greater wellbeing in a variety of ways.  For example, they imply 
higher spending power, increasing employees’ capacity to consume goods and services and to 
provide for their families.  However, there is an emerging literature questioning the link 
between income growth and happiness.  Recent empirical evidence indicates that, at least in 
the case of citizens in advanced Western economies, GDP growth is not associated with 
greater happiness (Easterlin, 2001).  Although Easterlin’s Paradox has not gone unchallenged 
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008) there is also evidence at a micro-level of a less clear-cut 
relationship between income and wellbeing.  Those receiving a random positive income 
shock, such as lottery winners, do indeed report higher levels of happiness than they had 
hitherto (Gardner and Oswald, 2007), but the effect often diminishes over time as they 
experience their new, richer environment.  This is not simply because they must contend with 
previously unforseen problems (solicitations from others etc.) but also because they become 
habituated to their new improved circumstances. Kahneman and Deaton (2010) argue that 
emotional well-being rises with log income, but not by much beyond $75,000.  
 
Warr (2007: 116) identifies a number of studies establishing a positive independent 
correlation between wages and job satisfaction. The association is robust across time and 
place. It is stronger with respect to pay satisfaction, but it is also statistically significant with 
respect to non-pecuniary aspects of the job.  The studies include longitudinal studies finding 
increases in pay leading to increases in job satisfaction, ceteris paribus (op. cit.: 228).  The 
emergent behavioural economics literature exploring the underlying reasons for this empirical 
regularity focuses largely on perceptions of fairness and reciprocity. Employees’ sense of 
self-worth may be enhanced if they feel well-paid for the job they do, if it confers social 
status or if it heightens perceptions of fairness in the wage-effort bargain (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999). Higher wages can also induce greater feelings of wellbeing when employees reflect 
with satisfaction on their rank in the wage distribution relative to their peers (Brown et al., 
2008), where they were in the past, or where they had hoped to be by this point in their 
career.  Conversely, a wage hike may be associated with lower worker wellbeing if the 
worker was anticipating a larger hike, or if her peers received larger increases.  A positive 
association between wages and satisfaction may also be observed if happiness increases 
productivity, as Oswald et al. (2009) show in a laboratory setting.  
 
The empirical literature investigating the links between wages and job-related anxiety and 
stress is in its infancy.  The literature on the association between wages and context-free 
anxiety is mixed, with some studies finding a link between low pay and high anxiety (eg. 
Gardell, 1971) while others report no statistically significant ceteris paribus association 
(Clark et al., 1996).  There are at least four reasons to anticipate a systematic relationship 
between job anxiety and wages.  First, as noted above, higher wages may be part of a wage-
effort bargain which is only partially observed by the analyst.  The wage is, in effect, 
compensating employees for taking on additional tasks or responsibilities which induce stress 3 
 
and anxiety.  Thus, although some people may be more satisfied in a job which requires them 
to work hard, it may nevertheless entail greater anxiety and stress than a job requiring lower 
levels of effort. In this setting, what is driving the relationship between JS, JA and wages is 
the unobservable heterogeneous preferences of employees that lead individuals to take high 
and low effort jobs with commensurately different rewards. Second, an unobservable 
productivity-enhancing trait may induce anxiety and affect wages.
1  For example, we know 
that job performance is wage enhancing and is positively correlated with the mental arousal 
(Kahneman, 1973) which is picked up in Warr’s anxiety/contentment scale (our JA measure) 
but not in job satisfaction.  The psychology literature distinguishes between ”challenge” 
stressors, which are positively correlated with job performance, and “hindrance” stressors 
which are negatively related to job performance (Lepine et al., 2005).  If anxiety inhibits 
learning and skill acquisition, for instance, this will lower earnings. Third, even though 
employees prefer higher wages, as indicated by their higher job satisfaction, higher wages 
may nevertheless generate anxiety and worry in employees who wish to justify their higher 
pay.  This may be viewed as a true causal impact of higher wages on JA. Fourth, an 
employee’s health may be affected by how much she earns relative to others.  Comparisons 
can be stressful for the individual, adversely affecting their health (Leigh and Jencks, 2006). 
 
We contribute to the literature by extending analyses of the link between wages and 
wellbeing to a new dimension of worker wellbeing – job anxiety - hitherto unexplored in the 





Our data are the linked employer-employee Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) 2004. The survey covers all sectors of the British economy with the exception of 
mining and quarrying; agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing; private households with 
employed persons; and extraterritorial bodies.  However, we confine our analyses to the 
private sector. Workplaces with at least 5 employees were sampled from the Inter-
Departmental Business Register with a view to conducting a face-to-face interview with the 
manager at the workplace responsible for employment relations.  The response rate was 64%.  
The respondent’s permission was sought to distribute an eight page self-completion 
questionnaire to a randomly selected set of employees at the workplace or, in the case of 
workplaces with fewer than 26 employees, all of them.  This permission was granted in 86% 
of cases.  A further 10% of workplaces did not return any questionnaires.  The overall 
response rate for the employee questionnaire was 61%.
2 
 
The data are particularly well-suited for the analysis of employee wellbeing for four reasons.  
First, we can control for workplace fixed effects and a broad array of job characteristics, as 
well as the standard controls for demographic and human capital attributes.  This permits us 
to compare and contrast the wellbeing of workers with different wages in the same 
workplace, the same occupation, with the same amount of job autonomy. Second, we have a 
variety of measures capturing worker effort which we can control for, namely supervisory 
status, overtime hours worked, and employee (dis)agreement with the statement “my job 
requires that I work very hard”.  Third, we can construct mean workplace wages from 
                                                 
1 Similarly, it has been argued that good performance leads to higher rewards which, in turn, lead to satisfaction 
(Lawler and Porter, 1967: 23). 
2 For more information about the survey see Kersley et al. (2006). 4 
 
employee observations, thus permitting us to investigate relative wage effects on workers’ 
wellbeing. Fourth, we have 14 measures of employee wellbeing capturing two broad 
measures of employee affect: 8 are measures of job satisfaction (JS) and 6 are measures of 
job anxiety and stress capturing Warr’s contentment-anxiety scale (Warr, 2007).   
 
3.1. Wellbeing measures 
Our data contain two sets of wellbeing measures.  The first set is employee responses to the 
following question: “Thinking of the past few weeks how much of the time has your job 
made you feel each of the following.. tense, calm, relaxed, worried, uneasy, content?”   
Responses are coded on a 5-point scale: “all of the time”, “most of the time”, “some of the 
time”, “occasionally”, “never”.  These measures have their origins in Warr’s (2007: 19-49) 
anxiety-contentment axis.  Warr distinguishes between the two ends of this axis along the two 
dimensions of pleasure and mental arousal. Anxiety, as measured by feeling tense, worried or 
uneasy, is associated with negative affect but entails a high level of arousal.  Contentment, on 
the other hand, as measured by feeling calm, contented or relaxed, is associated with positive 
affect and entails low levels of arousal.
3  Principal components factor analysis
4 of the six JA 
measures revealed two factors, one containing the measures of negative affect and the other 
containing the measures of positive affect.  This confirms Wood’s (2007: 159) analysis which 
also used WERS 2004 but for the whole economy.  However, as explained by Wood (op. 
cit.), there are good reasons to treat the items as forming a one-dimensional scale. Thus, 
following Wood, we combine the six items into a single scale.  Taken together these six 
anxiety-contentment items have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85.  Our single summative JA score 
rescales the five-point scores for each measure into (-2, 2) scales where ‘-2’ is “never” and 
‘2’ is “all of the time” having reverse-coded the positive affect items such that higher scores 
indicate higher job anxiety.  The scale thus runs from (-12, 12).  Just over one-third (35%) of 
the sample score above zero; one-tenth (10%) score zero; and the remaining 55% have 
negative scores. 
 
Our second set of wellbeing measures relate to job satisfaction.  Job satisfaction captures the 
pleasure-displeasure axis in Warr’s concept of subjective wellbeing.  We use all eight facets 
of job satisfaction available in the data. Employees are asked: “How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your job?... achievement you get from your work; the scope for using 
your own initiative; the amount of influence you have over your job; the training you receive; 
the amount of pay you receive; your job security; the work itself; the amount of involvement 
you have in decision-making at this workplace?”  Responses are coded along a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from “very satisfied” to “very dissatisfied”.  Principal component analysis 
identifies a single factor with an eigenvalue above 1 (4.04) explaining 51% of the variance in 
the items.  Factor loadings ranged from 0.52 (pay) to 0.82 (influence).
5 The empirical 
literature indicates that the relationship between wages and satisfaction is stronger with 
respect to pecuniary aspects of the job and that the correlates of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
job satisfaction differ. We therefore estimated the effect of wages on non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction (NPJS) and pay satisfaction (PS) separately.  The NPJS scale, which has a 
Cronbach's alpha of 0.85, incorporates all the satisfaction items excluding pay, thus running 
from (-14, 14). One-sixth (17%) of the sample score below zero; one-fifth (22%) score zero; 
                                                 
3 Our data contain no information relating to Warr’s other key axis for measuring JA, namely depression-enthusiasm 
(depression being low affect and low arousal, while enthusiasm is high affect and high arousal).  Since some of the 
predictors of depression-enthusiasm are known to differ from those for anxiety-contentment (Warr, 2007: 23) we 
cannot be sure how these other aspects of wellbeing may be associated with wages. 
4 We use orthogonal varimax principal components analysis with rotation. 
5 These results are similar to Wood’s (2008: 160) even though his analysis relates to the whole economy. 5 
 
and the remaining 61% score above zero. The relationship between wages and NPJS, on the 
one hand, and PJS on the other, were markedly different in some instances so we mainly 
focus on results based on these two job satisfaction scales rather than the GJS scale.
6  The pay 
satisfaction scale PJS runs from (1,5) with higher scores denoting higher satisfaction.  Thirty-
seven percent of the sample were either 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with their pay; 39% were 
either 'dissatisfied' or 'very dissatisfied'; the remainder were 'neither'. 
 
3.2: Wages 
Employees are asked: “How much do you get paid for your job here, before tax and other 
deductions are taken out? If your pay before tax changes from week to week because of 
overtime, or because you work different hours each week, think about what you earn on 
average.” Responses are recorded in fourteen bands ranging from “£50 or less per week 
(£2,600 per year or less)” through to “£871 or more per week (£45,241 or more per year)”. 
Employees are also asked: “How many hours, including overtime or extra hours, do you 
usually work in your job each week? Exclude meal breaks and time taken to travel to work.” 
To obtain hourly wages we obtain lower and upper bounds for the wage by dividing through 
by continuous hours and take the mid-point from each band (top-coding the open-ended 
upper band by multiplying the lower band by 1.5).  We drop the 155 cases whose hourly 
wage falls four standard deviations or more away from the mean hourly wage. We test the 
sensitivity of the hourly wage results to a log transformation and we test non-linear wage 
effects by introducing quadratic terms and by entering dummies capturing low pay (bottom 
quartile of the hourly wage distribution), mid-level pay (the two middle quartiles) and high 
pay (the top quartile). We also construct a measure of workplace mean wages by summing 
the individual wages of survey respondents and dividing by the number of observations at the 
workplace.  The individual’s own wage is excluded from this mean wage so that when we 
incorporate it alongside the individual’s own wage we are comparing the effects of own wage 
relative to the average wage of the worker’s co-workers. 
  
3.3: Control variables 
All models contain hourly wages, hours worked and a quadratic hours term. In parsimonious 
models we control age (9 dummies); academic qualifications (8 dummies); single-digit 
occupation (9 dummies); single-digit industry (11 dummies); log workplace employment size 
and a quadratic term; and dummies for disability, gender, ethnicity and low travel-to-work-
area unemployment (below 1.2%). We test the sensitivity of results to a ‘full’ model 
specification which also incorporates vocational qualifications (3 dummies); region (10 
dummies); and dummies for union membership, coverage by a collective bargaining 
agreement, marital status, having any dependent children, carer status
7, single independent 
workplace, and urban location.  The full model also replaces single-digit occupation with 
three-digit occupation dummies and includes proxies for effort described in the next 
paragraph. The workplace-level controls are replaced by workplace dummies in workplace 
fixed effects equations. 
 
An accurate portrayal of the relationship between wages, JS and JA relies upon the analysts’ 
ability to control for potentially confounding influences, such as aspects of the job which may 
be correlated with wages and wellbeing.  One such job characteristic is occupation: we 
                                                 
6 The correlation between the JA and NPJS is -0.45.  If one regresses them against one another they account for 
20% of the variance in the other. 
7 The dummy identifies those answering ’yes’ to the question: ”Do you look after or give help or support to any 
family members or friends who have a long-term physical or mental illness or disability, or who have problems 
related to old age?” Carer responsibilities may affect employees’ wellbeing directly, as well as their earnings potential. 6 
 
therefore control for occupation. Another is job discretion.  Those with opportunities to 
exercise discretion in their jobs are often rewarded for the additional responsibilities this 
entails, but discretion can also act as a buffer against stress and anxiety because it provides 
employees with what Warr (2007: 107) refers to as “opportunity for personal control”.  When 
this is low it is “expected to generate anxiety as people are unable to act on their negative 
environment to avoid danger and potentially harmful events” (op. cit.).  Thus it is important 
to control for job autonomy when seeking to identify the relationship between wages and 
wellbeing. We capture job autonomy with responses to the following question: “In general, 
how much influence do you have over the following….What tasks you do in your job, the 
pace at which you work, how you do your work, the order in which you carry out tasks, the 
time you start or finish your working day?” The responses have a four point scale (“a lot, 
some, a little, none”), from which we formed a summated rating that went from 0 (“none” on 
all five items) to 15 (“a lot” on all five items). 
 
In an attempt to isolate the link between wages and wellbeing net of effort we use three 
measures of worker effort: the number of overtime or extra hours the employee usually works 
each week, whether paid or unpaid; a dummy for supervisory status
8; and a dummy variable 






We analyse the relationship between wages and employee wellbeing using the additive scales 
for job anxiety (JA), and job satisfaction (NPJS and PJS) described in Section 3.1. We argue 
that the rescaling makes simple linear models appropriate. We undertake five sets of 
analyses. 
 
First we estimate the relationship between wages and wellbeing using OLS.  The wellbeing 
of worker i employed in workplace f can be expressed by Equation 1: 
 
1)  if f y if x if if X X Wage J ε β β β + + + = ' ' 1  
 
where Jif expresses job satisfaction (or job anxiety) for individual i in workplace f, Wageif 
expresses the wage of individual i in workplace f (different measures), the Xif’s express our 
vector of individual-level demographic and job characteristics, the Xf’s express our vector of 
workplace-level controls shared by all sampled in the same workplace, and εif represents a 
standard normal distributed error term. β1 gives the effect of wages on wellbeing on the 
assumption that wages are independent of wellbeing conditional on the other X’s we include 
in the model. Since the labour supply of women is less wage elastic than men’s it is possible 
that wages are a less important influence on women’s wellbeing than men’s. We explore this 
possibility by estimating separate analyses for men and women (tables not reported). 
 
Second, we estimate the association between wages and JA and JS simultaneously to identify 
the independent association between wages and these two measures of wellbeing having 
accounted for the possibility that JA and JS are jointly determined by factors that are not 
accounted for in our model, such as unobservable fixed characteristics of individual 
                                                 
8 The question is: “Do you supervise any other employees? A supervisor, foreman or line manager is responsible for 
overseeing the work of other employees on a day to day basis.” 7 
 
employees.  We therefore collapse our measures of JA and JS into dummy variables
9 and run 
a set of bivariate probit models estimated under the assumption that the errors have a joint 
normal distribution (Greene 2003). The bivariate probit model estimates one additional 
parameter representing the correlation between errors, relative to estimating two separate 
probits. The functional form assumptions identify the model when the same regressors are 
used for each dependent variable; no exclusion restriction is required. We present Wald test 
statistics for the null hypothesis that the correlation is equal to zero. We find that our two 
measures of wellbeing are indeed jointly affected by unobserved variables. The correlations 
are large and the Wald test is always statistically significant at a 1 per cent level.  
 
Third we present models which replace the vector of workplace controls with workplace 
dummies. These workplace fixed effects models allow us to examine the effects of 
employees’ wages on their JA and JS having controlled for fixed unobserved workplace 
characteristics.  
 
Fourth, we introduce the mean wages of the individual’s co-workers at the workplace to 
establish the importance of wage relativities in the workplace as a factor in employee 
wellbeing using the following specification for wellbeing: 
 
 2)  if f y if x f if if if X X Wage wage wage J ε β β β β + + + − + = ' ' ) ( 2 1  
 
where β1 measures the effect of individual own wage on wellbeing, and β2 measures the 
effect of relative wage within the workplace. By the standard omitted variable formulae, the 
bias term of an OLS estimate of Jif on individual wage only is then β2 (1-b), where b is the 
regression coefficient of Wagef with respect to wageif. A fixed establishment effect model 
provides a consistent estimator for (β1 + β2), since E(Wif – W.f )=(β1 + β2)(wageif -Wagef ), 
and a model including the average wage of the establishment Wif =  A+ (β1 + β2) wageif  - β2 
Wagef  + ui may provide an estimator for β2.   
 
The models are unweighted and so provide within-sample estimates, rather than population 
estimates.  Individuals’ probability of sample selection are not independent of one another 
since they are clustered within sampled workplaces.  Standard errors are adjusted to account 
for this using clustering
10 and we use the robust estimator to tackle remaining 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms. We drop all cases with missing data on any of the 
dependent or independent variables. The unweighted number of employee observations in the 
estimation sample is therefore 11,467 and they are clustered in 1,218 private sector 






Figure 1 shows the coefficients for hourly wages from regressions of each wellbeing 
measure, job anxiety (JA), job satisfaction (NPJS) and pay satisfaction (PJS), on wages. The 
                                                 
9 We construct the dummies such that roughly half the sample score ’1’ on the dummy variables.  The thresholds are 
>=0 in the case of the 24-point JA measure, >3 in the case of the NPJS 28-point measure and >2 in the case of the 
5-point PS measure. Results are not sensitive to adjustments in the threshold.    
10 This procedure is recommended by Moulton (1990). 
11 We lose around 2,000 observations by excluding workers with missing data on items used in the analysis. This is 
another reason why we decide to estimate within-sample rather than population estimates. 8 
 
coefficient may be interpreted as the increment in the average wellbeing index as we compare 
individuals earning one standard deviation higher hourly wages, conditional on hours 
worked. We note that while higher wages are associated with higher job satisfaction, they are 
also strongly associated with higher job anxiety.  
 
Job anxiety is positively associated with higher wages. The most immediate explanation for 
this result seems to be one of compensating wage differentials. We explore this hypothesis 
below. On the other hand, non-pecuniary job satisfaction is also positively associated with 
higher wages. In light of a compensating wage differential story, this is a more surprising 
result. If high wages compensate for negative job attributes, we would expect the raw 
correlation between job satisfaction and wages to be negative, not positive, in the absence of 
any other job attributes. To find a positive relationship between wages and pay satisfaction is 
of course less surprising, but again we would expect this correlation to be affected by a host 










































Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the association between wages and the three wellbeing 
measures, JA, NPJS and PJS. We run four model specifications. Column 1 contains a 
parsimonious set of controls, including age, education, industry, firm size, disability, gender, 
ethnicity and local unemployment. Column 2 adds a set of variables reflecting effort; 
overtime hours, supervisory responsibilities, hard work and work autonomy. Column 3 
introduces a more extended set of controls, including marital status and children as well as 3 
digit occupational codes, without the effort variables, what we term the ‘full’ model. Column 
4 adds the set of effort variables to the full model.  
 
Panel A indicates that higher hourly wages are associated with higher JA, even when we add 
the set of parsimonious controls. A one standard deviation increase in the hourly wage 
increases JA by 6 percent of the standard deviation in JA, or around .27 on the 24-point 9 
 
index, which is roughly one-fifth of the average JA score of 1.32. The effect is strong and 
statistically robust.
12   
 
The hourly wage coefficient increases from .3 to almost .4 when we go from Model (1) to 
Model (2), that is, when we control for effort and job autonomy. Adding the full set of 
controls does very little to change this picture: the coefficient remains around .3 with the full 
controls, and .4 including controls for effort and autonomy.   
 
These effort variables are themselves strong and significant in the JA equation. Column 1 in 
Table 2 shows the effect of effort on JA. The three effort controls (overtime hours, 
supervisory status, and agreeing that ‘My job requires that I work very hard’) are all positive 
and statistically significant, whereas job autonomy is negative and statistically significant.
13 14 
These effects are reasonable and suggest that efforts of this type may require some 
compensating wage differential. However, the fact that the effect of wages on JA increases 
rather than disappears when we control for effort and add detailed controls for jobs, 
individuals and workplaces, strongly suggests that compensating wage differentials is not the 
explanation for the relationship between wages and job anxiety. Higher wages seem to have 
an independent effect on subjective wellbeing, as measured by job anxiety, even when 
controlling for attributes of the individual, the workplace, occupation and various measures of 
effort.  
 
Panel B in Table 1 reports the results from the same models, but this time using non-
pecuniary job satisfaction (NPJS) as the dependent variable. Hourly wages are positive and 
statistically significant when effort is not in the equation. This may seem surprising, since we 
would expect that higher wages, which are associated with more effort, should have a 
negative effect on job satisfaction. However, when we look at the effect of effort indicators 
such as supervisory responsibilities and hard work, effort appears to be positively correlated 
with job satisfaction. Having a more challenging job is rewarding in itself, and what we pick 
up in models (1) and (3) may be the effect of a more challenging job on non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction. The coefficient drops between both models (1) and (2), and between models (3) 
and (4) with the addition of effort and job autonomy. The non-significance of the wage effect 
having controlled more fully for the nature of the job is consistent with what we would expect 
to find if higher wages are just a reflection of more challenging jobs. 
  
Panel C presents identical models but for pay satisfaction (PJS).  The coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant throughout. Even with the addition of a full set of job controls and 
effort, the coefficient changes little. In Table 2 we find that hard work has a negative effect 
on pay satisfaction, which is reasonable given a compensating wage story, whereas job 
autonomy has a positive effect, conditional on wages, suggesting that job autonomy is 
regarded as a positive attribute of a job. 
 
The effort controls in the Model (3) are informative in their own right since their associations 
with the three well-being measures are at odds with simple propositions regarding 
compensating wage differentials.  The coefficients are presented in Table 2. The perception 
that one’s job requires hard work is associated with higher job anxiety and is negatively 
                                                 
12 Results are similar when using log hourly wages. These are available from the authors on request. 
13 Full models are available on request. 
14 In sensitivity tests we introduced a quadratic term for hourly wages or dummies for quartiles of the hourly wage 
distribution. Although they occasionally proved statistically significant there was no compelling evidence of non-
linear wage effects. 10 
 
associated with pay satisfaction, suggesting the need for higher pay to achieve the same level 
of pay satisfaction.  However, hard work is also positively associated with non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction, a finding that runs counter to the need for compensating wage differentials.   
Similarly, supervisory responsibilities engender greater job anxiety, but they are also 
positively associated with non-pecuniary job satisfaction.  Overtime hours are correlated with 
more job anxiety but are not related to job satisfaction.  Longer working hours are associated 
with higher job anxiety, but the relationship follows an inverted u-shape, with job anxiety 
declining with very long hours.  Similarly, both pay and non-pecuniary job satisfaction fall 
initially with longer hours, only to rise with much longer hours.  These models suggest 
worker preferences for harder work or greater responsibility may not always require a 
compensating wage differential. 
 
Since the labour supply of women is less wage elastic than men’s it is possible that wages 
have less influence on women’s wellbeing than men’s. We therefore run separate regressions 
for men and women.  Although the hourly wage coefficients are a little lower in the case of 
women, the pattern of results is very similar to that for men and the differences in the male-
female coefficients on hourly wages are not statistically significant.
15 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of the association between wages and JA and JS simultaneously to 
identify the independent association between wages and these measures of wellbeing having 
accounted for the possibility that JA and JS are jointly determined by factors that are not 
accounted for in our model.  Although there is a strong, statistically significant negative 
correlation between the unobservables in the two equations the results are in line with those 
already reported. Hourly wages are positively associated with JA in all models. They are 
positively associated with PJS for all four model specifications (Panel B) but the association 
with NPJS becomes statistically non-significant in Model (2) and Model (4) when the effort 
controls are added.  
 
Table 4 presents workplace fixed effects models to examine the effects of employees’ wages 
on their JA having controlled for fixed unobserved workplace characteristics. Workplace 
dummies replace the workplace characteristics entering the previous models.  In doing so 
they increase the total amount of variance accounted for by the model compared to the 
equivalent OLS models in Table 1, though the differences are not dramatic. The within 
workplace effects of hourly wages are remarkably similar to the OLS estimates presented in 
Table 1.  Panel A shows JA rises with higher hourly wages, the coefficients being very 
similar to those presented in Table 1.  Panels B and C show a positive correlation between 
wages and NPJS and PJS respectively which are similar in magnitude as well as statistical 
significance to the OLS estimates..   
 
Effects of co-worker wages 
We have found a positive association between an individual’s wages and her job anxiety, and 
a positive association between wages and pecuniary job satisfaction. A key question is to 
what extent these effects arise from relative comparisons within the establishment or not. If 
relative wages matter, the OLS estimator of Table 1 is biased, whereas the fixed effect 
estimator of Table 4 provides the effect of increasing one’s wage, conditional on co-workers’ 
average wage, and is thus a sum of the relative and absolute wage effect. In Table 5 we thus 
                                                 
15 Women’s JA is higher than men’s whereas their wages are lower, which could induce a positive correlation 
between JA and wages. These results confirm that this is not what is driving the results. Full results are available on 
request. 11 
 
present models that are similar to the OLS estimates in Table 1 but they include an additional 
term capturing the mean wage of the individual’s workplace colleagues.  
 
If relative wages positively affect well-being, an increase in co-workers’ wages should lower 
one’s own well being. The coefficient of this variable is thus the negative of the relative wage 
effect, i.e. - β2 in equation 2 as outlined in Section 3.  
 
In the case of JA, the positive coefficients for hourly wages are very similar to those 
presented in Tables 1 and 4, while mean workplace wages are not statistically significant 
(Panel A), in particular when controlling for individual effort and job autonomy. This shows 
that the positive association between JA and hourly wage is due to the absolute wage level of 
the individual rather than wage comparisons within the establishment. The preferred model is 
thus the fixed effect model, providing an estimate of 0.45 (taken from Model (3) in Table 4).   
  
In the JS models presented in Panels B and C the hourly wage effects are akin to those 
presented in Table 1 and 4. However, mean workplace wages perform very differently in the 
case of NPJS and PJS.  Workplace mean wages are negatively correlated with NPJS – 
significantly so only in model (1) – whereas they are significantly positively associated with 
PJS in all models. Our preferred model is the full model, where we find no significant effect 
of absolute wages nor relative wages on NPJS.  
 
PJS is the only outcome that seems to be affected by relative wages. The coefficient of 
average wages of one’s co-workers is, however, positive (0.019), indicating that pecuniary 
satisfaction does not arise from improvement of one’s relative position in the establishment, 
but rather that it is enhanced if one’s co-workers are paid better as well.  These results 
relating to the correlations between both own wages and workplace mean wages and JS are 
very similar to Brown et al. (2008).  Using the 1998 predecessor of the survey we use in this 
paper, they also found positive correlations between own wages and PJS and NPJS, whereas 
workplace mean wages were positively associated with PJS and negatively associated with 
NPJS.   
 
Where our results differ is in showing a non-significant link between mean workplace wages 
and NPJS in our full model, a finding which is consistent with compensating wage 
differentials.  The job anxiety scale was not included in the 1998 survey: ours are the first 
results exploring links between workplace mean wages and JA and, as we have shown, the 
finding of no significant relationship differs markedly from that found for JS. 
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Job satisfaction and job anxiety are negatively correlated but still wages are positively 
associated with both . Our data lack suitable instruments for wages so we can not discount the 
possibility that some of the associations we find between wages and wellbeing are driven by 
unobservable features of employees. Still, the positive association between wages and job 
anxiety appear as a puzzle. A compensating wage mechanism would predict that this 
association should disappear once appropriate controls for effort are included. However, the 
effect is robust to the inclusion of rich individual, workplace and job controls in addition to 
several measures of effort. The positive association between wages and job anxiety actually 
become stronger when we control for effort, not weaker, and seems to reflect an independent 
negative relationship between pay and subjective wellbeing as measured by job anxiety. 12 
 
 
The persistence of the wage effects on job anxiety may be because a certain amount of job 
anxiety actually enhances job performance and thus increases wages, reflecting for example 
mental arousal (Kahneman, 1973).  Another possibility is that, even though employees prefer 
higher wages as indicated by their association with higher job satisfaction, higher wages may 
nevertheless generate anxiety and worry in employees who wish to justify their higher pay. 
Pay satisfaction is also positively associated with wages. This is not surprising. This 
relationship prevails even with extensive controls, even though the effect is slightly 
dampened when controls for effort are included.  
 
On the other hand, the positive association between higher wages and non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction disappears with the inclusion of our effort measures. Thus high levels of effort 
really provide high levels of non-pecuniary job satisfaction and higher wages, in contrast to 
what a simple compensating wage differentials theory would predict; namely lower job 
satisfaction and higher wages or higher job satisfaction and lower wages. 
 
The addition of the mean wage of other workers in the workplace reveals three important 
findings. First, its introduction does very little to the effects of one’s own wage. Second, 
higher co-worker average wages are associated with higher pay satisfaction. This is an 
important finding, consistent with Clark et al. (2009) who find that individual job satisfaction 
is higher where co-workers’ wages are higher. They suggest this is due to co-workers’ wages 
providing a positive signal about the individual’s own future earnings. In accordance with the 
findings of Brown et al. (2008), we find that higher mean workplace wages are associated 
with lower non-pecuniary job satisfaction, however, this effect ceases to be significant once 
we introduce a full set of controls. Third, we have shown for the first time that there is no 
significant relationship between workplace wages and job anxiety, suggesting that job-related 
stress and anxiety is associated with absolute levels of wages and not by wage comparisons 
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Table 1: OLS for correlation between wages JA, NPJS and PJS 











Panel A: Job Anxiety (JA)   
Hourly wage  .032  .039  .034  .040 
 (3.80)**  (4.77)**  (3.92)**  (4.91)** 
Adj. r-squared  0.04  0.17  0.09  0.18 
Panel B: Non-Pecuniary Job Satisfaction (NPJS)   
Hourly wage  .069  .003  .069  .003 
 (6.69)**  (0.29)  (7.02) **  (0.35) 
Adj. r-squared  0.01  0.30  0.12  0.31 
Panel C: Pecuniary Job Satisfaction (PJS)   
Hourly wage  .031  .027  .031  .027 
 (13.60)**  (9.98)**  (10.89)**  (9.80)** 
Adj. r-squared  0.04  0.09  0.08  0.10 
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted OLS of wellbeing and job satisfaction scales. JA=job anxiety; NPJS=non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction; PJS=pay satisfaction. N=11,467 for all models. 
(2) Robust estimator with clustered standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. *=significant at 95% confidence 
interval; **=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(3) Parsimonious model controls are:  age (9 dummies); academic qualifications (8 dummies); hours (and 
squared), single digit occupation (9 dummies), single-digit industry (11 dummies); log workplace employment 
size and a quadratic term; and dummies for disability, gender, ethnicity, and low travel-to-work-area 
unemployment (below 1.2%). The full model adds the following controls to the parsimonious model: vocational 
qualifications (3 dummies); region (10 dummies); dummies for home carer status, married or living as married, 
having any dependent children, union member, covered by a collective bargaining agreement, single 
independent workplace, urban location. It also replaces single-digit occupation with 3-digit occupation 
dummies. Effort proxies include a supervisor status dummy, continuous overtime hours worked, agreement with 




Table 2: Effort Coefficients  
  JA NPJS  PJS 
Overtime hours  .031  -.004  -.004 
 (3.79)**  (0.55)  (1.70) 
Supervisory 
responsibilities 
.690 .648  .012 
 (6.98)**  (6.66)**  (0.45) 
Hard work  1.150  .296  -.069 
 (21.74)**  (5.13)**  (4.90)** 
Autonomy -.301  .606  .054 
 (23.47)**  (44.40)**  (16.20)** 
 
Notes: 
(1) Effort coefficients and t-statistics taken from Model (4) in Table 1. JA=job anxiety; NPJS=non-pecuniary 
job satisfaction; PJS=pay satisfaction. N=11,467 for all models. 17 
 
Table 3: Bivariate Probit for correlation between hourly wages, JA and JS 
  Job anxiety  Satisfaction  athrho  Wald r=0  P for Wald 
Panel A: non-pecuniary job satisfaction 
M (1) Parsimonious  .007 (2.90)**  .016(5.74)**  -.519  838.05  0.0000 
M (2) Parsimonious incl. 
effort 
.009 (3.65)**  .001(0.36)  -.516  739.01  0.0000 
M (3) Full  .006 (2.73)**  .016 (5.86)  -.521  845.74  0.0000 
M (4) Full incl. effort  .008 (3.40)**  .001 (0.33)  -.512  734.12  0.0000 
Panel B: pecuniary job satisfaction 
M (1) Parsimonious  .006 (2.84)**  .037 (7.71)**  -.293  327.06  0.0000 
M (2) Parsimonious incl. 
effort 
.009 (3.58)**  .033 (7.14)**  -.254  236.38  0.0000 
M (3) Full   .006 (2.66)**  .036 (7.46)**  -.291  326.31  0.0000 
M (4) Full incl. effort  .008 (3.32)**  .033 (6.89)**  -.251  234.62  0.0000 
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted bivariate probits. Panels A derives a satisfaction dummy based on the non-pecuniary job 
satisfaction scale (SATSC7) while Panel B uses the pecuniary job satisfaction scale. 
(2) Robust estimator with clustered standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. **=significant at 99% confidence 
interval; *=significant at 95% confidence interval. 
(2) See Table 1 for controls 
(3) All models statistically significant with p>chi2 0.0000 18 
 
Table 4: Workplace Fixed Effects Models for correlation between wages and JA, NPJS and 
PJS  











Panel A: JA   
Hourly wage  .045  .045  .045  .046 
 (4.83)**  (5.01)**  (4.69)**  (5.06)** 
Adj. r-squared  0.13  0.21  0.13  0.21 
Panel B: NPJS   
Hourly wage  .088  .017  .086  .015 
 (10.92)**  (2.02)*  (8.31)**  (1.77) 
Adj. r-squared  0.19  0.36  0.36  0.36 
Panel C: PJS   
Hourly wage  .026  .021  .025  .021 
 (9.77)**  (8.30)**  (9.45)**  (8.06)** 
Adj. r-squared  0.14  0.19  0.16  0.19 
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted estimates. N=11,467. Robust estimator with clustered standard errors. T-stats in parentheses. 
*=significant at 95% confidence interval; **=significant at 99% confidence interval. 
(2) Parsimonious model controls are:  age (9 dummies); academic qualifications (8 dummies); and dummies for 
disability, gender, ethnicity. The full model adds the following controls to the parsimonious model: vocational 
qualifications (3 dummies); dummies for home carer status, married or living as married, having any dependent 
children, union member, covered by a collective bargaining agreement. It also replaces single-digit occupation 
with 3-digit occupation dummies and includes proxies for effort, namely a supervisor status dummy, continuous 
overtime hours worked, agreement with the statement “My job requires that I work very hard”, together with the 
job autonomy scale described in the text. 
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Table 5: OLS estimates of JA, NPJS and PJS incorporating mean workplace wages alongside 
individual hourly wages 










Panel A: JA   
Hourly wage  .038  .041  .038  .041 
 (4.41)**  (5.00)**  (4.23)**  (4.91)** 
Mean workplace wage  -.036  -.011  -.031  -.011 
 (1.83)  (0.57)  (1.67)  (0.63) 
r-squared 0.09  0.17  0.09  0.19 
Panel B: NPJS   
Hourly wage  .076  .008  .074  .006 
 (7.61)**  (0.95)  (7.50)**  (0.74) 
Mean workplace wage  -.044  -.029  -.032  -.021 
 (2.11)*  (1.43)  (1.62)  (1.17) 
r-squared 0.11  0.30  0.13  0.32 
Panel C: PJS   
Hourly wage  .029  .024  .028  .024 
 (10.68)**  (9.54)**  (10.51)**  (9.38)** 
Mean workplace wage  .017  .017  .020  .019 
 (3.73)**  (3.66)**  (4.20)**  (4.16)** 
r-squared .07  .10  0.08  0.12 
 
Notes: 
(1) N=11,415.  
(2) Mean workplace wage excludes individual’s wage. Derivation is described in the text. 
(3) For other details of models see Table 1. 
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